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Abstract
ABSTRACT: This paper presents an analysis of the interaction of hu-
man capital investment and the development of social and political institu-
tions. We ﬁnd that human capital matters - for growth through its quality
dimension; for distributional conﬂict by raising political aspirations. But
human capital does not stand alone either. The level of economic devel-
opment (output) matters, distributional (instability) conﬂi c ta sw e l la st h e
rights dispensation can come to inﬂuence human capital investment deci-
sions in their own right. Social, human capital, political as well as economic
dimensions are densely interwoven in webs of association.
KEYWORDS: Human capital investment, fractionalization, social and
political dimensions of economic growth, South Africa
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1. Introduction: Theoretical Priors
The departure point of the present paper is that time series data
from South Africa permits of the exploration of a number of new forms
of interaction between social and institutional variables, and a range of
distinct measures of human capital creation. In the subsections that
follow, we explore the data for the nature such associations might
take. Before we embark on the exploratory data analysis, we begin
with the postulation of a number of theoretical possibilities concerning
the association between human capital and social and institutional
structures.
The now large literature on economic growth has already come to
establish the possibility of an impact of institutions and social capital
on long term economic development.1 Formulations have been both
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1A review can be found in Fedderke (1997).Does Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 2
self-consciously empirical,2 explicitly theoretical,3 or a combination of
the two.4 Motivation for the inclusion of a wide range of institutional
and social capital measures ranges from the need to control for prop-
erty rights,5 to control for the lack of discretionary power on the part
of the state,6 the predictability of the investment environment,7 the
lowering of transactions costs in exchange transactions through both
formal property rights and informal social capital structures,8 the im-
pact of distributional conﬂict mobilized along ethnic lines,9 direct dis-
ruptive impacts of political instability, 10and various invocations of
modernization theory.11
Similarly the introduction of human capital as a driver of economic
growth is well established in the literature.12 The impact of human
capital is introduced directly into the production function, 13indirectly
as a spill-over from the process of investment in physical capital14 and
from direct Schumpeterian human capital investment in innovation.15
2See for instance the standard citation provided by Barro (1991).
3See for instance Alesina et al (2002).
4Such as in Easterly and Levine (1997) and Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi,
2004.
5See North & Thomas (1973, 1973), North (1981, 1990), and Scully (1988,
1992) by way of example.
6See Borner et al (1995).
7See Dixit and Pindyck (1994), and the speciﬁc application in Fielding (1997)
and Fedderke (2004) to South Africa.
8See Coleman (1988, 1990), Fukuyama (1995a, 1995b), and Fedderke, De Kadt
and Luiz (1999).
9See Easterly and Levine (1997), Alesina and Perotti (1993) Deutsch (1961)
and Persson and Tabellini (1994).
10See the discussions in Alesina and Perotti (1993), Barro (1991), Edwards and
Tabellini (1991), Londregan and Poole (1990), Knack and Keefer (1995) and Ve-
nieris and Gupta (1986).
11Typically Lipset (1959).
12For a comprehensive overview see Fedderke (2002).
13As in Lucas (1988), and alternatively Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992).
14As in Arrow (1962), Romer (1986).
15See Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt
(1992).Does Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 3
The introduction of a range of indicators that cover human capi-
tal formation, as well as social, institutional even political dimensions
raises a concern that has now often been voiced in the literature sur-
rounding economic growth. The presence of such a wide range of
indicators introduces the possibility of complex forms of associations
not only between the outcome variable and the intended drivers of the
outcome variables, but amongst the drivers themselves. This is in ad-
dition to the standard diﬃculty of potential feedback eﬀects from the
economic development indicators to institutional, political and social
dimensions. Examples are provided by Fedderke and Klitgaard (1998)
on the basis of empirical evidence. Alesina et al (2002) provide addi-
tional evidence and theoretical deliberation. In Fedderke, Luiz and De
Kadt (2004) we provide an extensive investigation of the impact webs
of associations between institutional, social and political dimensions
might have, employing time series data for South Africa.
For instance, suppose the presumption (based on the range of lit-
erature cited above) is that:
Y = F(K,L,R,H) (1)
where Y denotes output, K physical and H human capital, L labour
input, and R an institutional dimension.
It is also feasible that institutions are not independent of the level
of economic development (the modernization hypothesis),16 nor of the
16Deutsch (1961: 78) deﬁned modernisation as
the process in which major clusters of old social, economic, and psychological
commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns
of socialisation and behaviour ... away from a life of isolation, traditionalism and
political apathy, and ... into a diﬀerent life of broader and deeper involvement in
the vast complexities of modern life, including potential and actual involvement
in mass politics.
It was expected that socio-economic progress would promote educational attain-
ment by the population at large, which would further understanding of political
issues and increase their expectations for political participation and civil liberties.
This, in turn, would be strengthened by the increasing availability and pervasive-
ness of the mass media, as information technology becomes more accessible toDoes Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 4
state of human capital. Increases in the human capital stock may well
generate increased demands for political self-expression, or improve
the understanding of any disempowered portions of the population of
how to organize in support of their interests (Fukuyama, 1992: 116,
Deutsch, 1961, Apter, 1968, Neubauer, 1967).The consequence may
well be both an increase in political instability, a decrease or an in-
crease in political rights or no change at all in rights (depending on
whether ruling elites respond by attempting to repress or coerce dis-
sent). But the educational system may also carry direct homogenizing
consequences for social dimensions such as the linguistic diversity of
the population, or, depending on the nature of the educational sys-
tem, on religious diversity (think of any one of a number of theocratic
states) (Fukuyama, 1992: 46).
Nor for that matter is it implausible that the state of institutions
can come to inﬂuence human capital. In Fedderke and Luiz (2002) we
showed that school performance for the African population in South
Africa was strongly determined by the level of political instability
(amongst other things). Given that the school population was inti-
mately involved in the opposition to Apartheid, with a substantial
part of the African National Congress’ strategy relying on the mobi-
lization of school populations, this is not an implausible ﬁnding. But
the point surely generalizes beyond the South African experience. One
possibility is that democracy leads to a greater recognition of the de-
mands for the human capital required to succeed in the labour market.
But autocratic political dispensations might also be more able to en-
sure the social savings required to generate the resources required for
the production of good quality human capital. Certainly both Putnam
(1993, 1995) and Fukuyama (1995) suggest the possibility of a link be-
tween social and human capital. Indeed, the original introduction of
social capital was precisely in relation to the generation of human cap-
all. Increasing prosperity would also lead to the expansion and mobilisation of
disadvantaged sections of society. All these factors would culminate in a revolt
against the political status quo controlled by the traditional elites, in favour of
competition for political power.Does Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 5
ital in inner city neighborhoods (see Coleman 1988). The empirical
ﬁndings of Glaeser et al (2004), echoing the theoretical propositions
advanced by Djankov et al (2003), conﬁrm that both the institutional
and productive capacities of societies are shaped by human and social
capital endowments.
Thus the suggestion is that equation 1 might be supplemented by:
R = G(Y,H) (2)
H = H(Y,R) (3)
At least to the extent that such relations should be tested for.
There is a second order concern here. The general suggestion that
human capital might drive both output and the state of institutions,
and might itself be inﬂuenced by the level of economic resources and
the state of institutions sounds plausible. But it also leaves a substan-
tial part of the question begging.
Which institutions, how, at what stage of economic development,
for what types of human capital, are all questions that immediately
spring to mind. The questions extend to both the institutional and the
human capital dimensions. In terms of rights, for instance, political
and property rights might come to impact on human capital formation
both to a diﬀerent degree, and might impact on diﬀerent types of
human capital formation, diﬀerent levels of human capital formation
(primary vs. secondary vs. tertiary), or on the quality as opposed
to the quantity of human capital. Given the diversity of institutional
dimensions now available, the diﬃculty for the empirical researcher is
generally that theoretical guidance is absent. The approach we adopt
in the present paper is therefore one of exploring extensively what
patterns of association emerge from the data.
Since the intention in the present paper is to have a wide coverage
of institutional and human capital measures, in a context that allows
for the exploration of directions of “causation,” and in the presence of
wide variances in the dimensions being measured, South Africa oﬀers
itself as an interesting case study. For South Africa we have a wideDoes Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 6
range of measures of the institutional environment. These include
political rights, property rights, racial, linguistic and religious frac-
tionation, political fractionation, and political instability.17 The same
can be said for human capital measures, which cover the quantity of
human capital output (as measured by school enrolment rates - for the
total population, as well as the principal racial categories - and total
degrees issued by universities), proxies for the quality of human capital
produced (the proportion of school matriculants sitting for mathemat-
ics in their standardized exit examinations; the proportion of total
degrees in the natural, engineering and mathematical sciences), the
level of inputs into the educational system (pupil-teacher ratios, real
per-pupil expenditure), proxies for throughput rates of the educational
system (the proportion of the pupil population graduating), as well as
the quantity of “applied” training output (apprenticeships).18
Such data is available over long time runs in South Africa: covering
the 1917 -1997 period. The interaction between such variables is thus
able to be explored in a time series context - including testing for the
d i r e c t i o no fa s s o c i a t i o nb e t w e e nv a r i a b l e s .
Finally, what renders South Africa particularly interesting is that
in both institutional and human capital dimensions variation is large
by any standards. Political instability has varied from virtual com-
plete stability to periods of intense and sustained instability. Rights
similarly have varied substantially over time - see the extensive dis-
cussion in Fedderke, De Kadt and Luiz (2000). In Fedderke, Luiz and
De Kadt (2004) we demonstrate that even in the case of the fraction-
ation indexes (linguistic, religious, racial) South Africa shows often
strong changes over the course of the twentieth century. Given the
Apartheid discrimination between racial groups, human capital pro-
duction in South Africa has similarly varied from ﬁrst to typically
third world standards - see the extensive discussion in Fedderke, De
Kadt and Luiz (1999, 2003).
17See Feddderke, De Kadt and Luiz (2001) and Feddderke, Luiz and De Kadt
(2004).
18See Fedderke, De Kadt and Luiz (2000, 2003).Does Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 7
The case lends itself to the exploration of interactions between
social, political and economic dimensions of development. In part to
understand South Africa itself - but above all to shed light on the
interaction of these three dimensions by utilizing the evidence that
only longitudinal data can provide, in order to draw general inferences
on the institutional determinants of economic growth.
Section 2 of the paper begins the exploration of the possible in-
teraction between human capital formation, social, political and insti-
tutional variables, as well as a range of indicators of economic devel-
opment. Section 3 reports the impact of human capital formation on
social, political and institutional variables (SPIVs). Section 4 investi-
gates the nature of the impact of human capital on economic growth.
Section 5 establishes what impact social, political and institutional
variables have on human capital investment. Section 6 presents struc-
tural equation results, and section 7 concludes.
2. Patterns of Association
Since the core questions in this paper relate to the nature of asso-
ciation between variables in a wide range of dimensions, in a context
that is poorly theorized, we begin by an extensive exploration of the
bivariate structure of interaction between variables included in this
study. We provide a guide to the variables used, and the source of the
data employed in Appendix A.
In order to explore the directions of association between the vari-
ables included in this study, we consider the use of the test statistic
proposed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1996, 2001) (hereafter PSS) F-
statistics.19 We report the resultant F-statistics in Table I and Table
19See also the discussion in Pesaran (1997) and Pesaran and Shin (1995a, 1995b)
and Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001). Suppose that the question is whether there
exists a long run relationship between the set of variables yt,x 1,t...xn,t.Univariate
time series characteristics of the data are not known for certain. The PSS approach
to testing for the presence of a long run relationship proceeds by estimating the
error correction speciﬁcation given by:Does Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 8
II. 20 A number of distinct patterns emerge from the data:
• A relatively large number of human capital variables exercise an
impact on the SPIV-variables
• A relatively small number of SPIV-variables exercise an impact
on the human capital variables.
• Core features of the impact of the human capital variables on
the SPIV-variables are: 21
1. — Linguistic fractionation is driven by virtually all hu-
man capital measures employed in this study.




















The test proceeds by computing the standard F-statistic for the joint signiﬁcance
of δ1 = δ2 = ...= δn+1 =0 , under all feasible alternative LHS variables. While
the distribution of the test statistic is non-standard, with xi,t ∼ I(0)∀i providing
a lower bound value,xi,t ∼ I(1)∀i an upper bound value to the test statistic. The
test is analogous to a Granger causality test, but in the presence of non-stationary
data. This renders the PSS F-test suitable in the current context.
20Appendix B reports the univariate time series characteristics of the data. In
Fedderke, Luiz and De Kadt (2004), we examine the implications of conducting es-
timations in the light of the full information on the order of integration of the data.
The PSS ARDL cointegration estimation technique employed below, is considered
robust to diﬀerences in the order of integration of the data - see the discussion
in Pesaran (1997) and Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1995a,b, 1996). Nevertheless,
readers should note that results can prove sensitive to data transformation - as
demonstrated in Fedderke, Luiz and De Kadt (2004).
21We also found an impact of white real per capita expenditure on political
rights, and from school enrollment rates on property rights.Does Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 9
— Political instability is driven by a range of human
capital measures. 22
— Growth is also driven by a wide range of human cap-
ital measures.23
• Core features of the impact of the SPIV- and economic variables
on the human capital-variables are: 24
— ∗ Enrolment rates in schooling are driven by the real
GDP, capital stock measures, and political rights.
∗ Tertiary educational output (total degrees as well as
math and science proportions) appears to be driven
by political instability, property rights and real GDP,
and some (racial and religious) fractionalization mea-
sures.
∗ The proportion of matriculants sitting mathematics
is driven by political instability and growth.
In what follows we explore these potential patterns of association
between the variables further. We employ the ARDL cointegration
22These include school enrolment rates, measures of inputs into the schooling
production function (pupil-teacher ratios, real per capita expenditure), measures
of schooling throughput (proportion of pupils in matriculation), and both quan-
tity (total degrees) and quality (proportion of NES degrees) measures of tertiary
education.
23These include school enrolment rates, measures of school quality (maths pro-
portions), measures of inputs into the schooling production function (pupil-teacher
ratios, real rep capita expenditure), measures of schooling throughput (proportion
of pupils in matriculation), and both quantity (total degrees) and quality (propor-
tion of NES degrees) measures of tertiary education.
24We also ﬁnd evidence suggesting that the number of apprenticeship contracts is
driven by the real capital stock; that pupil-teacher ratios are driven by religious and
political fractionation; matriculation pass rates are driven by religious, political
and linguistic fractionation; real per pupil expenditure is driven by the real capital
stock, political instability and linguistic fractionation measures.Does Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 10
estimation techniques proposed by Pesaran (1997), Pesaran and Shin
(1995a,b, 1996), and Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1996, 2001). We em-
ploy the structure provided by the evidence to emerge from the F-tests
and commented on above.
3. The Impact of Human Capital Formation on SPIV’s
To explore the patterns of association between the variables sug-
gested by the PSS F-tests further, we estimated the suggested asso-
ciations by means of ARDL cointegration techniques. The starting
point of the analysis is bivariate. Summary reports are provided in
the form of diagrammatic representations of the results for each of
the structural divisions dealt with below. We report only statistically
signiﬁcant results, unless otherwise indicated.25
The impact of human capital on the SPIV variables of this study
is pervasive, multi-dimensional, multi-layered and narrowly focused.
What we mean by this apparently contradictory statement is that hu-
man capital impacts on the SPIV’s, but through very speciﬁc channels
in the sense of aﬀecting only a few of the SPIV measures. However,
where human capital does impact on SPIV’s, we ﬁnd that the impact
is pervasive in that a relatively large number of the human capital
measures impact on the SPIV. The impact also tends to be multi-
dimensional in the sense that quality and quantity dimensions of hu-
man capital formation will impact on the SPIV, and multi-layered
since schooling, tertiary and practical human capital formation comes
to exercise an impact.
The two main channels through which human capital impacts on
social and political dimensions is through its impact on linguistic frac-
tionation, and through its impact on political instability. In the case
of linguistic fractionation, we ﬁnd results that are broadly consistent
with the modernization hypothesis. In the case of political instability,
human capital formation appears to fuel political aspirations.
25Detailed results in tabular form are available from the authors on request.Does Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 11
The only remaining statistically signiﬁcant impacts of human cap-
ital on the SPIV’s are restricted to the political and property rights
dimensions. Schooling inputs in the form of real per pupil expenditure
in white schooling exercises a positive impact on political rights. A
ﬁnding that might be considered to be consistent with a modernization
process akin to that found for linguistic fractionation (for details see
below). In the case of property rights, we ﬁnd both total and black
school enrolment to be positively associated with property rights -
again a ﬁnding consistent with rising aspirations under conditions of
increased access to human capital.
We therefore focus our discussion on the two main channels through
which human capital formation appears to function: linguistic frac-
tionation and political instability.
4. The Impact of Human Capital Formation on Linguistic
Fractionation
Human capital formation in South Africa appears to have had
a pervasive impact on linguistic fractionalization over the twentieth
century.
This general ﬁnding is not surprising. A schooling system which
maintains a systematic language policy, and which is in any degree
inclusive of succeeding generations of scholars, is likely to exercise an
inﬂuence on the language of ﬁrst preference of households.
But there are additional plausible inﬂuences on linguistic prefer-
ences of households also. The language of commerce and industry
in South Africa has predominantly been English. In addition, un-
der the Apartheid dispensations policy orientation strongly favoured
Afrikaans. As a consequence there were strong incentives for all popu-
lation groups to acquire either English or Afrikaans or both as working
languages 26 - with the consequence that at least some households con-
26Afrikaans remains the most widely understood language across all population
groups, with 46% of the population understanding Afrikaans, 43% English, and
22% Zulu - see Shuring (1991:640). Though the top three ranking ﬁrst languagesDoes Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 12
ceivably switched from other languages to the working languages as
the language of ﬁrst use.
Within these general insights, there is important nuance to be
found in the empirical evidence. Figure 1 provides a summary of the
estimation results.
Core ﬁndings to emerge are as follows:
• The quantity of schooling, as measured by school enrolment
rates, appears to have served the function of integrating the
diverse linguistic groups during the twentieth century. As al-
ready suggested, the presence of language policies that empha-
sized English and Afrikaans, with other languages being rele-
gated to third language status, renders this ﬁnding plausible.
School throughput (as measured by the proportion of the school
population matriculating) exercises the same impact under con-
ditions broadening access to schooling for blacks. 27
• The quality of education - as measured by the proportion of ma-
triculants sitting mathematics and the matriculation pass rate
in the part of the schooling system that received the strongest
ﬁnancial and teaching support (white schooling) - appears to
aﬀord the opportunity of greater linguistic fractionation. One
explanation of this ﬁnding, is that better schooling systems can
support more diﬀerentiated linguistic instruction (white school-
ing had very diverse third language choices available), and hence
perpetuate linguistic diversity. The proportion of matriculants
sitting mathematics has been in steady decline28 -at r e n dm i r -
rored in the range of third language instruction 29 -p r o v i d i n ga
of households remain Zulu, Xhosa, and Afrikaans - see Race Relations (2003).
27Fedderke et al (2000) provides an extensive discussion of the South African
schooling human capital indicators employed in the present study, and how they
relate to the quantity, quality, and policy environment.
28See the extensive discussion in Fedderke et al (2000).
29See for instance Mesthrie (1993), and the discussions in Mesthrie (2002).Does Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 13
suggestive indication that the link from the quality of the school-
ing system, to the range of linguistic instruction to ﬁnal house-
hold linguistic fractionation may well be operative for South
Africa.
• The inputs into schooling, as measured by pupil-teacher ratios
and real per pupil expenditures, can either serve to raise or
lower linguistic fractionation. White measures are positively re-
lated to linguistic fractionation, black measures are negatively
related. The implication is twofold. Most signiﬁcantly, policy
orientation in schooling carries implications for linguistic frac-
tionation. White schooling policy in South Africa emphasized
quality and aﬀorded wide choice, though it was expensive to
maintain.30 Thus linguistic diversity was fostered in the presence
of good resourcing in white schooling. In eﬀect, sound quality
of schooling for whites allowed immigrant populations to main-
tain their linguistic provenance. By contrast under Apartheid
in black schooling policy did not emphasize quality, but focused
on broadening access instead. In addition, incentives for the
black population wishing to gain access to the languages of in-
dustry and administration were to acquire the relevant working
languages. Improved inputs here thus plausibly had the eﬀect of
improving integration. Moreover, the formal educational system
may have played a role in systematizing African languages over
time, with the result that regional diﬀerentiation would have
diminished over time - much as in Europe for instance.31
• While our discussion has focused on the schooling system, we
note that the conclusions generalize to the tertiary education
system also. Both the quantity and the quality points are found
for the university system also, with the total number of degrees
(as proxy for the quantity dimension) serving to lower linguistic
30See again the discussion in Fedderke et al (2000).
31Examples from Germany, France, Italy and the UK spring to mind. See the
discussion in Anderson (1983) and Weber (1979).Does Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 14
fractionation, while the proportion of NES degrees (as proxy for
the quality dimension) increases linguistic fractionation.32
• The point even extends to the practical training aﬀorded by
apprenticeship contracts. An increase in the quantity of appren-
ticeship training, lowers linguistic fractionation.
A number of general points bear noting about this evidence. First,
note that public education policies are able to exercise an inﬂuence on
a social dimension traditionally thought of as substantially immutable
(viz. for instance linguistic fractionation). Second, incentives faced
by social agents may also come to inﬂuence linguistic fractionation
substantially over time. Third, the impact of human capital formation
on linguistic fractionation is exercised across a wide range of diﬀerent
dimensions of human capital formation (quality vs. quantity), and
across a wide range of levels of human capital formation (schooling
vs. tertiary vs. practical training). Finally, and perhaps surprisingly,
linguistic fractionation shows little signs of itself coming to inﬂuence
human capital formation (see the discussion in section 5 below) - at
least in South Africa.
In broad terms, the evidence might be deemed consistent with the
modernization hypothesis, though the quality dimension adds nuance.
Those population groups most engaged in a process of economic “mod-
ernization,” (in the sense of entering formal labour market structures
often explicitly denied them) are those that have employed human
capital formation in a process of social inclusion and integration. The
educational and economic elites by contrast have deployed human cap-
ital formation as part of its consumption opportunities - emphasizing
the possibility of linguistic diversity, since they were already econom-
ically and socially integrated and privileged.
These conclusions prove to be robust to the extension of estima-
tion to a multivariate framework. In order to extend the analysis to
32See Fedderke et al (2003) on the extensive presentation of the data, and its
relation to the quantity, quality and policy of tertiary educationDoes Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 15
a multivariate framework, we employ the ARDL cointegration esti-
mation framework of Pesaran and Shin (1995a,b) and Pesaran, Shin
and Smith (2001), since this estimation method is more robust to
diﬀerences in the order of integration across variables than the Jo-
hansen VECM framework, which requires all variables to be vI(1).33
In columns 1 and 2 of Table III we report the estimation of a relation-
ship which controls for the quantity of human capital formation (by
either total or black school enrolment rates), for the quality of human
capital formation (by the proportion of NES degrees, and the propor-
tion of white matriculants sitting mathematics),34 as well as real per
pupil expenditure in black schools.
The ﬁndings remain consistent with those that we obtained for the
simple bivariate associations reported above - and the error correction
mechanisms conﬁrm the presence of an equilibrium relationship. The
measures associated with the quantity and expenditure of schooling
for blacks consistently serve to lower linguistic fractionation. The
measures associated with the quality of schooling, allow for greater
linguistic diversity.
The conclusion remains: human capital formation can change the
degree of linguistic fractionation. And the nature of human capital
formation can profoundly inﬂuence the nature of such change, with
the primary distinction being between quantity and quality of human
capital formation.
Linguistic fractionation is therefore less ﬁx e dt h a ni ti so f t e nh e l d
to be, and human capital policies and incentives move linguistic char-
acteristics of society potentially dramatically.35
33See Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990, 1992).
34Mathematics in the white schooling system would constitute the most de-
manding instruction in the best part of South African schooling - and hence serve
as proxy for schooling quality.
35The example of Asian linguistic fractionation in South Africa that we explore
in greater detail in Fedderke, Luiz and De Kadt (2004) provides a dramatic illus-
t r a t i o no ft h i sﬁnding.Does Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 16
5. The Impact of Human Capital Formation on Political
Instability
Human capital formation in South Africa also appears to have had
a substantial inﬂuence on the level of political instability in South
Africa. Again, the impact of human capital is found to emerge from
across a range of human capital dimensions (both quantity and quality
measures), and across a range of levels of human capital (schooling vs.
tertiary).
The general ﬁndings to emerge are really two-fold.
First, access to human capital by marginalized and oppressed social
groupings appears to have served to raise political aspirations in South
Africa, fuelling demands for change, and hence political instability. 36
Second, for economic and social elites the eﬀect of increased and
improved access to human capital raises the cost of conﬂict. The
incentives become either to search for a resolution to conﬂict, or to
move to draconian forms of political repression - in short, to limit the
extent of political conﬂict. 37
36Indeed black schooling in South Africa became one of the focal points of popu-
lar uprisings by the marginalized against the apartheid system (Wilson and Ram-
phele, 1989: 340, Bonner et al, 1993). The 1976 Soweto uprisings represents one of
the most vivid examples of political instability associated with the black schooling
system but in fact this resistance was continuous at black schools. The schooling
system provided a fertile ground for this mobilization and unrest because education
liberates people from ‘prejudices and traditional forms of authority. Education also
makes people demand more of themselves and for themselves’ (Fukuyama, 1992:
116).
37For example, Lipton (1985: 227) states that by the early 1970s, there was a
‘growing convergence of views among capitalists about the rising costs and inconve-
nience of apartheid.’ Furthermore, the increasing international hostility towards
apartheid posed a threat to the external economic interests of capitalists. The
apartheid state came under increasing challenge in the 1980s, as South African
society became increasingly mobilised. Du Toit (1995: 348-350) asserts that the
state’s response to this deﬁance was initially to embark on ‘reform apartheid’ in
the 1970s and early 1980s, and later turn to the counter-revolutionary ’total strat-
egy’ oﬀensive. The constitutional reforms of the former strategy were visible in
the Tricameral Parliament (1984) and the Regional Services Councils (1985). TheDoes Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 17
Detailed results are depicted in Figure II. In particular, we ﬁnd
that:
• The quantity of both schooling and tertiary education (measured
by school enrolment rates and total and NES degrees), appears
to have served the function of increasing the level of political in-
stability over the sample period. School throughput (measured
by the proportion of the school population matriculating) ex-
ercises the same impact. Since the sample period was one of
broadening access to schooling for blacks, the throughput mea-
sure may well be capturing the same information as the direct
quantity measures.
• The quality of education appears to have little impact on the
level of political instability. The only exception is at the tertiary
level and is given by the proportion of NES degrees, which is
negatively associated with political instability.
• The impact of inputs into schooling diﬀers between white and
black schooling. Increasing black per capita expenditure has a
positive impact on political instability, providing an interpre-
tation consistent with that reached on the quantity of human
capital formation: increased access to human capital stimulates
aspirations for access to political power. Only the pupil-teacher
ratio proves signiﬁcant for white schooling - with a higher pupil-
teacher ratio associated with higher instability. Our interpreta-
tion of the ﬁnding is that this association is an indirect reﬂection
of the impact of Apartheid distributional policies on the politi-
cal process. The white pupil-teacher ratio declined consistently
since the 1950’s - reﬂecting the level of resourcing devoted to
intention was to co-opt sections of the population into the formal political process,
but to do so in such a way that they would be unable to determine the course of
decisions. To placate civil bodies, various forms of petty apartheid were eased (for
example, the deracialisation of public facilities).Does Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 18
white schooling. It thus directly reﬂects the injustice of the pol-
icy, and it is not surprising that declining white pupil teacher
ratios (with the implied resourcing eﬀects) should trigger greater
agitation for political transformation on the part of the majority
of the population.38 It might also suggest that the white elite
in South Africa had an increasing incentive to damp political
conﬂict - either by recourse to ever increasing repression (fur-
ther stimulating opposition), or ﬁnally by reaching a political
accommodation.
The ﬁrst general point we drew at the outset of this subsection
follows readily from the speciﬁc evidence. Greater access to human
capital creation uniformly appears to have fuelled the political aspi-
rations of the black population - with the consequence that political
instability increased. All of the statistically signiﬁcant measures of
human capital creation for the black population carries this inference.
The second general ﬁnding is more tentative, and we postulate it
hypothetically. The possibility really arises from the ﬁnding on white
pupil-teacher ratios and to some extent on the NES degree propor-
tion.39 With a rising investment in the human capital stock of an
elite (NES degree proportions), and a rising investment in the means
of delivery of such an investment (pupil-teacher ratios), the elite has
an incentive to defend that investment through increased repression.
The result is likely to be greater pressure for reform by the excluded,
triggering yet further repressive responses. The result may be an up-
ward ratcheting of political instability and human capital privilege
of the sort that was witnessed in South Africa under Apartheid. At
least up to the point where the cost of the conﬂict outweighs the cost
38Note that the black pupil-teacher ratio carries the reverse sign to that on white
schooling - consistent with our interpretation. It is insigniﬁcant - perhaps due to
the shorter sample period for which reliable data is available for black schooling.
39The latter measure does capture the training of a social elite, which was pre-
dominantly white over the sample period of the study - though not entirely so. As a
consequence the interpretation presented follows for this variable in overwhelming
though not perfect extent.Does Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 19
of political accommodation for the elite - at which point democratic
transformation may follow. The South African experience is sugges-
tive here.
Again the inferences drawn on the basis of the bivariate data ex-
ploration generalize to multivariate estimation contexts. We employ
the ARDL cointegration estimation framework suggested by Pesaran
et al (2001). Columns 7 and 8 of Table III report the impact of both
quantity (either total or black school enrolment rates) and quality
(NES degree proportion) measures of human capital on political in-
stability. Variables maintain the signs they established in the bivariate
associations, and the error correction mechanism continues to conﬁrm
the presence of an equilibrium relationship. Once again, the quantity
of schooling proves to have increased the pressure for political trans-
formation in South Africa, while the quality of schooling served to
diminish such pressure.
The interpretation provided above, of rising political aspirations
with rising access to human capital, and of rising vested interests in
maintaining stability with rising quality of human capital thus remains
consistent with the multivariate evidence.
We will note in a following subsection that political instability may
itself come to inﬂuence the nature of human capital formation.40 But
for the moment we note again that human capital creation appears
to have notable consequences for the institutional dispensations of a
society also.
6. The Impact of Human Capital Formation on Economic
Growth
The possibility of an impact of human capital formation on long
run growth has a long history in the literature. Theoretically, hu-
man capital exercises its impact as the result of learning spill-overs
from direct physical capital investment,41 through enabling Schum-
40Fedderke and Luiz (2002) explores the point in greater detail.
41In the Arrow(1962) and Romer (1986) mold.Does Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 20
peterian innovation, 42directly through its inclusion in the production
function,43 or directly in a modiﬁed Solow-Swan model.44 For a com-
prehensive review of the issues see Fedderke (2002).
Empirically, ﬁndings on the impact of human capital on growth
have been mixed. While one strand of the literature has found support
of a positive impact of human capital on growth,45 dissenting voices
have consistently questioned the ﬁndings, disputing the strength of
the association, the sign of the association, even the plausibility of
any relationship being present in the ﬁrst instance.46To the best of
our knowledge, evidence on the impact of human capital on South
African growth has only received one prior examination. Fedderke
(2001) explores the possibility of the Schumpeterian channel of in-
ﬂuence on TFP growth. The central ﬁnding to emerge is that while
quality measures of human capital formation has a positive impact on
TFP innovation, quantity measures of have a negative impact.
In the present study we have access to a wide range of human capi-
tal measures, covering both quantity and quality dimensions, diﬀering
levels of human capital formation (schooling, tertiary and practical),
input measures into human capital formation, and throughput rates of
human capital production. We therefore brieﬂy explore the possibility
of a direct impact of human capital formation on long run growth.
The general ﬁndings to emerge are symmetrical to those reported
for TFP growth. Once again, quantity measures of human capital for-
mation are negatively associated with economic growth, while quality
measures are positively associated.47
42Through increasing the intermediate inputs into production in the Romer
(1990) or Grossman and Helpman (1991) formulation, or the quality ladders ap-
proach of Aghion and Howitt (1992).
43As in Lucas (1988).
44As in Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992).
45See for instance Jones (2002).
46See Easterly (2001: ch4) and Pritchett, 2001.
47In Fedderke et al (2000) we discuss the nature of the apartheid educational
system. We show that even in the ﬂagship white education system the emphasis
was often on throughput rather than quality. The proportion of white matriculantsDoes Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 21
Figure III summarizes the ﬁndings - recognizing the symmetry of
results between the real growth rate, and the real per capita growth
rate.
The speciﬁc ﬁndings are that:
• The quantity of both schooling and tertiary education (mea-
sured by school enrolment rates and total and NES degrees), is
negatively associated with economic growth. School throughput
(measured by the proportion of the school population matricu-
lating) exercises the same impact. Since the sample period was
one of broadening access to schooling for blacks, the through-
put measure may well be capturing the same information as the
direct quantity measures. The negative ﬁnding on the South
African quantity measures of human capital formation may well
be explained by the fact that the majority of the schooling sys-
tem in South Africa was of poor quality. At the same time, a
large proportion of GDP was allocated to education (approxi-
mately 8% of GDP by the early 1990’s - far higher than the
average of 4% in upper middle income countries).48 Thus allo-
cating a signiﬁcant amount of resources to low quality human
capital formation may prove to be a misallocation of resources -
with opportunity costs for the formation of other forms of cap-
ital in society. The interpretation of the quantity measures of
human capital in South Africa, may thus be symmetrical to the
interpretation of the quality measures of human capital forma-
sitting for mathematics fell from 100% in the 1920s to 40% by the 1980s. In the
black education system this phenomenon was even more severe. Public black
education only started receiving attention from the late 1950s and then the focus
was on expanding access to education (widening) to the black masses rather than
on building quality (deepening) the education system. It is therefore not surprising
that quantity measures show up negatively associated with growth because it was
often achieved at the expense of lowering quality.
48See the extensive discussion of these points in the context of an educational
production function for whites and blacks in South Africa in Fedderke and Luiz
(2002).Does Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 22
tion advanced below. Quantity in the absence of quality does
not deliver any bang for your buck.49
• The quality of both schooling and tertiary education (measured
by the proportion of matriculants sitting mathematics, and the
proportion of NES degrees) has a positive impact on long run
growth. The divergent ﬁnding is that matriculation pass rates
are negatively associated with long run growth.
• The impact of inputs into human capital formation diﬀerenti-
ates between diﬀerent parts of the educational system in South
Africa. While increased inputs into the black schooling system
have a negative impact on growth (measured by real per pupil
expenditure), increased inputs into the white schooling system
had a positive impact (measured by real per pupil expenditure).
In Fedderke et al (2000) we provided detailed evidence of the
quality diﬀe r e n t i a lb e t w e e nb l a c ka n dw h i t es c h o o l i n gi nS o u t h
Africa. On the evidence the distinction drawn between the two
schooling systems was that black schooling provided widened
access to low quality schooling, while white schooling provided
relatively high quality education - though to a small section of
the population. The divergent evidence can thus be interpreted
as providing additional support to the distinction between the
impact of quantity versus quality of human capital creation on
economic growth. The divergent ﬁnding is that rising pupil-
teacher ratios in white schooling are negatively related to eco-
nomic growth.
• We note also that the black pupil-teacher ratio and the NES
degree proportion both appear to have a positive impact on the
real capital stock -though we are unsure of the appropriate in-
terpretation of this ﬁnding.
49This is not to say that human capital should not be extended, but rather that
it should not be at the expense of quality.Does Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 23
The implication of these ﬁndings is immediate. The ﬁndings sug-
gest that human capital does matter for growth. But it also matters
what form human capital investment takes. Quality matters more
than quantity of education - at least for growth purposes. In this sense
the ﬁndings of the present paper conﬁrm or are consistent with the
more elaborate econometric results to emerge from Fedderke (2001)
on human capital impacts on TFP growth. Finally, the results serve
to provide some insight into why international studies into the impact
of human capital on economic development might come to generate
divergent ﬁndings. Especially in cross-country studies it is diﬃcult
to control for diﬀerentials in the quality of educational production -
rendering results sensitive to country sample selection and potentially
t h et i m ep e r i o do ft h es a m p l e . I ng e n e r a l ,f e wo ft h eg r o w t hs t u d -
ies that control for human capital diﬀerentiate between both quantity
and quality of education. Yet the results of the present study suggest
that the real purchase of human capital on economic growth emerges
precisely from quality rather than quantity of education.
Finally, we note also that the impact of human capital formation
on growth does not emerge only from schooling. The impact of human
capital formation appears to generalize across diﬀerent levels of human
capital investment. Given that we ﬁnd the positive impact of human
capital formation to emerge from quality, this ﬁnding is plausible.
Good schooling systems may well depend on good tertiary educational
systems, since sound teacher inputs are unlikely to be independent of
the tertiary level training the teachers receive. In eﬀect, quality in
education may be subject to indivisibilities.
As in the previous subsections, we conﬁrm that these ﬁndings ex-
tend to multivariate estimation. Utilizing the ARDL cointegration
framework of Pesaran et al (2001), columns 3 through 6 of Table III
report multivariate speciﬁcations for both growth in real GDP and
real per capita GDP. We control for both the quantity of human capi-
tal formation (by either total or black school enrolment rates), and for
the quality of human capital formation (by the proportion of NES de-
grees, and the proportion of white matriculants sitting mathematics).Does Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 24
Signs remain consistent with the bivariate ﬁndings: it is the quality
rather than the quantity of human capital formation that is impor-
tant for growth purposes, and the error correction coeﬃcients conﬁrm
the presence of an equilibrium relationship. The only diﬀerence in
these ﬁndings is that the quantity measures prove to be statistically
insigniﬁcant, rather than negative, where quality of human capital
investment is also controlled for. The resource misallocation interpre-
tation suggested above for the negative bivariate associations should
thus be treated with caution: but the importance of quality for growth
remains a robust ﬁnding.
Human capital matters for growth in South Africa. But not just
any old human capital. Quality is integral to the growth process -
quantity only if it is a vehicle for delivering quality.
7. The Impact of SPIV’s on Human Capital Formation
There are also some potential feedback eﬀects from the SPIV’s
included in the study to human capital formation. While the impact
of human capital on SPIV’s appears to be more pervasive, a number
of noteworthy patterns plausible on ap r i o r igrounds emerge from the
ARDL cointegration estimations.
First amongst these is a positive impact from the real capital stock
and real output measures on the quantity of human capital creation
(all of the enrolment rates included in the study), including practical
training (apprenticeship contracts), as well as a positive impact from
real capital stock on real per pupil expenditure (in white schooling).
There are three alternative interpretations of the evidence. The ﬁrst is
a straightforward demand-eﬀect. Growth in the economy as measured
by output and capital stock, leads to a spill-over demand eﬀect for
increased skills, and hence for schooled or trained labour. The sec-
o n di sa sad i v e r s i ﬁcation eﬀect - with the accumulation of capital or
wealth, the capital stock of the economy assumes more diﬀerentiated
formats, with an increased reliance on human capital in addition to
physical capital. Finally, note that the evidence is also consistent withDoes Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 25
a Romer (1986) learning spill-over type eﬀect, with human capital cre-
ation accompanying the investment in physical capital (hence output
growth).50
Second, there are impacts that reﬂect the unique history of South
Africa, but also highlight that human capital formation can itself come
to reﬂect struggles over the distribution of resources. Thus we ﬁnd a
negative impact of political fractionation on white and black matricu-
lation pass rates and a positive impact on white pupil-teacher ratios.
Finally, political instability has a positive impact on black real per
pupil expenditure in schooling, and a negative impact on the white
mathematics proportion amongst matriculants.
All of these impacts are consistent with the distributional strug-
gles that racially biased policies of the twentieth century generated
in South Africa. In South Africa, political fractionation decreased
under the Apartheid parliaments, and was higher at other times.51
The implication here is therefore that under Apartheid (decreased
fractionation), white pupil-teacher ratios fell, and matriculation pass
rates rose. This conﬁrms the emphasis placed on allocating substantial
resources to white human capital formation found by many studies.
The improved inputs come to be reﬂe c t e di na ni m p r o v e dp e r f o r m a n c e
in the standardized examinations conducted at the conclusion of the
matriculation year.
But the improved allocation of resources to whites was not uncon-
tested. In Fedderke, De Kadt and Luiz (2000, 2003) we detail that
while the black education system was both poor, and under resourced
relative to the white, the 1970’s and 1980’s saw a widening of access
particularly to schooling, but also to tertiary education by blacks -
with a related increase in resourcing. The evidence of the present pa-
50The correspondence is not exact. Romer (1986) spill-overs take the form of
learing eﬀects amongst the existing labour force, hence generating eﬃciency gains
in production - not a stimulus of human capital investment in formal schooling.
However, the existence of learning eﬀects in industry may create a preparatory
up-skilling by rational labour suppliers.
51See the discussion in Fedderke, De Kadt and Luiz (2001) and Fedderke, Luiz
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per links this process to political instability. The positive impact of po-
litical instability on black real per pupil expenditure, and the negative
impact on the white mathematics proportion amongst matriculants,
suggests that increasing political pressures on the white-dominated
state might have generated attempts to buy greater political calm, by
increasing the relative allocation of resources to black schooling.
While policy during the twentieth century thus generated a perva-
sive bias toward allocating increased resources devoted to improving
the quality of education for whites, distributional and political strug-
gles did not allow such bias to remain uncontested. Political oppo-
sition forced a reaction from the state even under Apartheid policy
- with increased resources coming to be allocated to black education
over time52 (though diﬀerentials to whites remained large).53
Two general points emerge from the present subsection. The ﬁrst
is that we ﬁnd conﬁrmation for demand- or spill-over type eﬀects in
South Africa. Increases in production and/or capital stock appear to
generate increases in human capital formation also. Second, distrib-
utional conﬂict associated with social fractionation is not restricted
to economic output alone - distributional conﬂict can extend to the
production of human capital also. The point of Easterly and Levine
(1997) concerning social fragmentation thus ﬁnds general purchase in
South Africa.
52Even in the early 1990’s, per pupil expenditure on whites was seven times that
on black pupils. See Fedderke et al (2000).
53There are also a number of additional impacts of SPIV’s on human capital
creation that we note, but ﬁn dal i t t l em o r ed i ﬃcult to place in a wider conceptual
framework:
-Both religious fractionation and real GDP have a positive impact on black
pupil-teacher ratios.
- Both religious fractionation and racial fractionation have a positive impact on
the NES degree proportion.
Given the diﬃculty of interpretation, we do not comment further on these ﬁnd-
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8. A Structural Model
Exploratory data analysis provides concrete content to the general
structural model of equations (1.1) through (1.3). Practical considera-
tions of time series estimation preclude consideration of all but a parsi-
monious representation of the general lessons that have emerged from
the exploratory data analysis. We emphasize the key generic lessons
to have emerged in formulating the structural model with which we
conclude our analysis.
First, the key institutional dimensions of the structural system are
those that explicitly represent the level of explicit conﬂict present in
the society and economy, and which capture the key social identity
dimension along which distributional conﬂict was organized. In the
South African context, this required the inclusion both of the measure
of political instability, and of racial (as opposed to the more stan-
dard ethno-linguistic) fractionalization. Second, this provides three
structural equations in real per capita output, in human capital, and
in political instability. Third, we control for both the quantity and
the quality dimensions of human capital investment, recognizing that
these may have distinct impacts on institutional and growth outcomes.
T h eu n i v a r i a t et i m es e r i e ss t r u c t u r eo ft h ed a t ae m p l o y e di nt h e
study is reported in Appendix B. The evidence conﬁrms the presence of
level, ﬁrst diﬀerence and second diﬀerence stationary variables. Esti-
mation of the structural system is by standard time series techniques,
with variables that are ﬁrst-diﬀerence stationary. Johansen54 tech-
niques of estimation are now standard, so that discussion of estimation
methodology here can be brief. We employ a vector error-correction
mechanism (VECM) framework, for which, in the case of a set of k
variables, we may have cointegrating relationships denoted r,s u c h
that 0 ≤ r ≤ k − 1. This gives us a k-dimensional VAR:
zt = A1zt−1 + ···+ Amzt−m + µ + δt (4)
54See Johansen (1991) and Johansen and Juselius (1990).Does Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 28
where m denotes lag length, a µ set of deterministic components and






Γi∆zt−i + Πzt−k+1 + µ + δt (5)
The existence of r cointegrating relationships amounts to the hypoth-
esis that:
H1 (r):Π = αβ
0
(6)
where Π is pxp ,a n dα,β are pxrmatrices of full rank. H1 (r)
is thus the hypothesis of reduced rank of Π.W h e r e r>1,i s s u e so f
identiﬁcation arise.55 Estimation is by VECM cointegration.
We begin with a structural system that incorporates both the
generic lessons to emerge from the preceding exploratory data analy-
sis, and the most general formulation of the base-line propositions
proposed in the fractionalization literature. Core to this approach is
the proposition that the social fractionalization at the root of distrib-
utional conﬂict, has an impact not only on instability, but directly on
the quality of policy formulation. In the current context, therefore, as
a starting position we postulate a possible impact of fractionalization
on political instability, on output directly (due to poor growth-related
policy formulation), and on human capital investment.56 In South
Africa, the social cleavage at the heart of distributional conﬂict has
been race, and hence we employ racial fractionalization as the appro-
priate measure in our structural equation model.
We postulate a labour intensive output (denoted LYPC) equation
which loads on the investment rate (IY), the user cost of capital (UC),
55See Wickens (1996), Johansen and Juselius (1990, 1992), Pesaran and Shin
(1995a, 1995b), Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1996).
56That South African human capital formation has been adversely aﬀected by
the pursuit of racially motivated policy formulation is standard in the literature.
See for instance Fedderke and Luiz (2002), Fedderke et al (2000, 2003), as well as
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political instability (INSTAB), math and science degree proportions
(NESPR), as well as the change in racial fractionalization (DRACE).57
Second, we postulate that political instability (INSTAB) in turn is
driven by the change in racial fractionalization (DRACE), per capita
output (LYPC), property rights (PROP) and human capital invest-
ment in both quality and quantity dimensions (NESPR, TENROL).
Finally, we postulate that the quality dimension of human capital
investment (NESPR) is determined by the change in racial fractional-
ization (DRACE), per capita output (LYPC), political rights (POL),
and the quantity of human capital production (TENROL). We further
incorporate the insight of Fedderke and Luiz (2005) that crime rates
(CRIMPOP) impact on South African growth processes also. Hence:
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in which T denotes a time trend, and identiﬁcation proceeds by β14 =
β16 = β17 = β18 =0 ; β24 = β25 = β2.10 =0 ; β35 = β36 = β37 =
β38 =0 . In addition, we impose weak-exogeneity restrictions on racial
fractionalization and the property rights dimension, such that, α11 =
α12 = α13 = α51 = α52 = α53 =0 .58. Given space constraints, in the
57The ﬁrst diﬀerence speciﬁcation is driven by the iI(2) structure of racial frac-
tionalization in South Africa. Inclusion into the Johansen VECM framework thus
requires the ﬁrst diﬀerence transformation.
58The exogeneity restrictions were extensively tested. Results that justify the
restrictions under which estimation proceeds here have been presented more ex-
tensively elsewhere - see Fedderke and Luiz (2005). Exogeneity of the racial com-Does Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 30
discussion of the empirical results which follows, we focus primarily
on the characteristics of the ß-cointegrating vectors, though we uni-
formly note the stability characteristics of the structural models that
we investigate.59
Note that the speciﬁcation of the structural model is such as to cap-
ture the theoretical structure postulated by equations (1.1) through
(1.3) - though it also captures the most generic lessons derived from
the preceding exploratory data analysis. Human capital creation is
granted both a direct impact on growth, through the quality dimen-
sion, and an aspirational impact on instability through both quantity
and quality dimensions. The model also explicitly allows for feedback
from institutions to human capital formation - with output, social
fragmentation and distributional (instability) conﬂict being aﬀorded
the opportunity to impact on human capital investment. Core results
from the exploratory data analysis are thus present - though with a
“ﬂattening” of nuance necessitated by the parsimony requirements our
sample size imposes on us.
Table IV reports the maximal eigenvalue and trace statistics on
the number of cointegrating vectors present in the data.
Both tests reveal the presence of at least two cointegrating vectors
- and in the case of the trace statistic of up to three CV’s at the 10%
level of signiﬁcance. Given that generally the trace statistic is given
preference on the grounds of its better power characteristics in small
samples, and given the theoretical priors of equations (1.1) through
(1.3), we proceed on the assumption of three CV’s.
Results from estimation are reported in column (1) of Table V.
Estimation results are generally in line with priors. Rising per
position of a population has immediate intuitive purchase. While property rights
exogeneity may be more controversial, note that the restriction is merely on con-
temporaneous feedback eﬀects. Moreover, that property rights might lead political
rights has additional support in the literature (Sened, 1997; Weimer, 1997; Schultz,
1992), and is justiﬁable on the grounds that rights over property might be granted
in an attempt to lower the danger of political change that might widen access to
rights over setting the fundamental rules of the game.
59Full details of the a-loading matrix are available from the authors on request.Does Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 31
capita GDP, and improving property rights serve to lower political
instability.60 Improving quality of human capital investment (NE-
SPR) lowers instability, while an increase in the quantity measure of
human capital investment (TENROL) serves to raise political instabil-
ity, conﬁrming the ﬁndings of our exploratory data analysis. Finally,
rising racial fractionalization (DRACE) serves to raise political insta-
bility. Rising racial fractionalization, political instability and crime
rates all serve to lower real per capita output, while rising real in-
vestment rates, user cost of capital, and the quality of human capital
measure all serve to increase real per capita GDP. Of the preceding all
variable signs correspond to standard theoretical priors and the pre-
ceding exploratory data analysis. The only potential surprise arises
with respect to the positive association between the user cost of cap-
ital and output. Nevertheless, the ﬁnding is consistent both with a
Romer (1990)-type framework, in which ﬁnal goods production rises
in real interest rate since the sustainable rate of return on capital in-
creases, and (more directly for the current context) with the ﬁnding
that stringent macroeconomic stabilization policy is growth enhanc-
ing.61 In the third cointegrating vector, the quality of human capital
investment rises in the quantity of human capital investment, real per
capita GDP, political instability, and political rights.
Unfortunately, the base-line results of column (1) suﬀer from three
distinct problems that collectively are fatal for the speciﬁcation being
tested. First, the implied elasticities (computed at variable mean mag-
nitudes) that attach to output (54.80) and the quantity human capital
variable (74.96) in the political instability equation, and racial frac-
tionalization (168.48) suggest a strength of impact that is implausible.
On the other hand, the remaining implied elasticities of the speciﬁca-
tion do not suﬀer from this constraint. Second, note that particularly
the change in racial fractionalization variable is simply not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant in either the political instability or the human capital
60Conﬁrming the ﬁndings of Fedderke and Luiz (2005).
61The ﬁnding has strong empirical provenance see for example - and for the
South African time series context is strongly conﬁrmed by Mariotti (2002).Does Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 32
investment equations. Third, as cointegrating relationships the three
equations do not show error correction behaviour - as evidenced from
impulse response functions.62 Extensive sensitivity tests of the spec-
iﬁcation, particularly with regard to the role of property rights, did
not serve to resolve the three estimation problems.63
As a second speciﬁcation we thus postulated a fractionalization
impact only on output and on instability, excluding a direct fraction-
alization disruption of human capital investment. Further, the direct
impact of crime rates on output is zero-restricted, though crime rates
continue to exercise an impact in the short run dynamics of the spec-
iﬁcations. Thus identiﬁcation proceeds by β14 = β16 = β17 = β18 =
0;β24 = β25 = β28 = β2,10 =0 ; β31 = β35 = β36 = β37 = β38 =0 ,
while the weak-exogeneity restrictions on racial fractionalization and
the property rights dimension, such that, α11 = α12 = α13 = α51 =
α52 = α53 =0 , remained unchanged.
Results are reported in column (2) of Table V.
Results in general remain unchanged from those reported under
column (1). Variable signs remain consonant with theoretical and ex-
ploratory data analysis priors (with one exception discussed below). A
crucial gain under the revised speciﬁcation is that the three cointegrat-
ing vectors demonstrate the presence of error correction behaviour in
all three vectors, lending stronger conﬁrmation to the presence of coin-
tegration in the data. Statistical signiﬁcance of the change in racial
fractionalization variable is now present in both the output and the
instability equations. Unfortunately, the economic signiﬁcance of the
variables that was questionable in the ﬁrst estimated structural sys-
tem, remains problematic. Human capital (elasticities of 37.35, 26.46
for the quality and quantity human capital dimensions respectively) in
the instability equation, and changes in racial fractionalization (elas-
ticity of 29.9) in the output equation continue to have implausibly
large impacts. Note further that both the quantity and the quality
62Space constraints preclude the full reporting of the impulse responses for this
and subsequent structural models. Results are available from authors on request.
63Full results are available from the authors on request.Does Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 33
of human capital investment in the instability equation serve to raise
political instability - reversing the divergent impact of the base-line
structural speciﬁcation and the exploratory data analysis.
As a ﬁnal structural speciﬁcation we therefore also zero restrict
the direct impact of the change in racial fractionalization on output
as well as its impact on human capital formation. Crime rates are
excluded from the speciﬁcation altogether. Identiﬁcation is therefore
by means of β14 = β16 = β17 =0 ;β21 = β24 = β25 = β2,9 =0 ;β31 =
β35 = β36 = β37 =0 ;with weak-exogeneity restrictions on racial
fractionalization and the property rights dimension again unchanged
at α11 = α12 = α13 = α51 = α52 = α53 =0 .
Estimation results are reported in column (3) of Table V.
In the third speciﬁcation all variable signs correspond to theoret-
ical priors; error correction is present for the long run relationships
estimated in the three cointegrating vectors; and while the human
capital quality elasticity in the instability equation remains large, the
order of magnitude is substantially lower than in the preceding two
speciﬁcations. As for the second structural speciﬁcation, both the
quantity and the quality of human capital investment proxies serve
to increase the level of instability - again reversing the ﬁndings of the
preceding exploratory data analysis. Impulse response functions con-
ﬁrm the presence of error correction behaviour for all three structural
relationships.
A number of core implications follow from the estimation.
First, human capital exercises both a direct impact on output (via
the quality dimension of human capital investment), and an indirect
impact through its impact on political instability. Importantly, while
human capital investment serves to raise output through its direct im-
pact, the estimation ﬁndings are consistent with the possibility that
human capital investment raises political aspirations, and hence polit-
ical instability under conditions of poor political rights dispensations.
The human capital impact on growth thus has two countervailing fea-
tures. The direct impact on output is positive; but since human capital
also serves to raise instability and since instability lowers output, itDoes Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 34
exercises a negative impact on output also. The net eﬀect of a one
percent increase in human capital on the estimated elasticities at vari-
able mean values is marginally negative - though very small (elasticity
of 0.06). In the context of developing and middle income countries
that often ﬁnd themselves in political transition, the potential dual
impact of human capital may provide at least a partial explanation
of why the international literature on the growth impact of human
capital ﬁnds an unstable, sometimes negative sometimes positive, or
ambiguous empirical impact of human capital variables.64
Second, human capital itself comes to depend not only on the
level of economic development (as measured by per capital GDP),
but on the institutional dispensation under which economic agents
accumulate human capital. Political instability as well as improving
political rights are found to fuel investment in quality human capital.
Since political instability is likely present precisely under conditions
under which pressure for political reform and hence improving rights
are high, such ﬁndings are consistent with increased incentives on the
part of agents to increase investment in mobile capital (rather than
irreversible investment in physical capital), of as high a quality as is
feasible. The implied objective is to maximize the accumulation of
capital that is maximally mobile in international terms.
The results of Glaeser et al (2004) who ﬁnd an impact of human
capital on institutions ﬁnds conﬁrmation from both our structural
and our exploratory data ﬁndings.65 Human capital formation does
indeed lead to institutional transformation by stimulating the political
instability that ﬁnally led to the political transformation of South
Africa. The nuance to emerge from the ﬁndings reported here is that
the institutional context also exercises an inﬂuence on human capital
formation. Both instability, and the level of rights appears to impact
on human capital investment decisions also.
Third, the contrast provided by the results of the speciﬁcations
reported under columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table V, sheds additional
64See Pritchett, 2001.
65Similar ﬁndings are also reported by Djankov et al (2003).Does Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 35
light on debates surrounding the impact of fractionalization, conﬂict
and growth. Our results suggest that the primary channel of inﬂuence
of social cleavage is through raising the level of (distributional) con-
ﬂict - in our study measured by political instability. While there is
some evidence to suggest that there may be a direct impact of racial
fractionalization on output (perhaps due to poor policy choices), such
evidence is weakened by the implausibly strong impact returned from
estimation. In broad terms our results are thus consistent with the
implications of for instance Easterly and Levine (1997) 66-b u to u rﬁnd-
ings add the important caveat that the channel of inﬂuence through
which fractionalization exercises its inﬂuence may simply be conﬂict.
Controlling for both conﬂict (properly measured) and fractionaliza-
tion in growth speciﬁcations may be an unnecessary overspeciﬁcation
of the requisite model. Finally, the reported results, especially in
the light of our ﬁndings that suggest linguistic fractionalization to be
an endogenous outcome of human capital formation, with racial frac-
tionalization being the true driver of distributional conﬂict in South
Africa, suggests that homogenous measures of fractionalization across
societies may not be readily available. Which social cleavage serves
as the organizing device for distributional conﬂict may diﬀer between
societies - with immediate consequences for cross sectional study.
9. Conclusions and Evaluation
The structural model estimated above has demonstrated that re-
sults consistent with the theoretical deliberations of the introduction
can be obtained from our data set. Importantly, the nuance provided
by our exploratory data analysis was useful in obtaining a more precise
speciﬁcation of the structural relations, faced as we were by a large
and often confusingly interrelated data set. The core lessons of the
investigation remain that human capital matters - for growth through
66Though studies that employ fractionalization either aﬃrming the Easterly
and Levine (1997) result, or critical of it, are myriad. See for instance Sachs and
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its quality dimension; for distributional conﬂict by raising political as-
pirations. But human capital does not stand alone either. The level
of economic development (output) matters, distributional (instability)
conﬂict as well as the rights dispensation can come to inﬂuence human
capital investment decisions in their own right. Social, human capi-
tal, political as well as economic dimensions are densely interwoven in
webs of association. Not without system, but nevertheless complexly
interwoven.
For us a central learning point of this analysis has been that theory
is important in understanding such complex interactions. But learn-
ing from extensive exploratory data analysis in nuancing theoretical
structure when ﬁtting it to data was equally important - all the more
so in its exploration not only of multiple feasible dimensions of the
data, but also in terms of the directions of association between vari-
ables in a time series context. There is scope to draw conclusions here
beyond those that are feasible from the cross-country studies that have
dominated the growth literature thus far.
Six general substantive conclusions emerge from the study for the
growth literature.
Fractionalization matters for economic growth. This conﬁrms other
ﬁndings in the literature. But importantly fractionalization appears to
lower growth primarily by raising instability or distributional conﬂict,
rather than necessarily leading to poor policy choices (though some of
this may happen too under high fractionalization). This is good news
for policy purposes, since if instability can be controlled, the eﬀect of
fractionalization can be quarterized without having to also insure the
policy making process against the impact of extensive social cleavage.
67
A corollary to the inference drawn on the mechanism through
67This leaves moot the question of how best to minimize instability - through re-
pression or through sound rights dispensations. One might hypothesize that rights
represent the more stable long term solution, though the literature does suggest
that the transitional dynamics here may be non-monotonic. See for instance Barro
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which fractionalization functions, is that the particular social cleavage
along which distributional conﬂict is organized, may vary according
to historical and social location. In South Africa during the twentieth
century it appears to have been racial cleavage - but in other contexts
this could be religious (Northern Ireland, Sudan), or as suggested by
the literature ethno-linguistic fractionalization.
Linguistic fractionalization is now frequently employed in the growth
literature. Yet our results show that linguistic fractionalization is en-
dogenously determined by a range of diﬀerent types and levels of hu-
man capital investment. Far from being a constant, unchanging deter-
minant of underlying distributional conﬂict potential, it responds to
changing human capital endowments. Even where linguistic cleavages
generate conﬂict potential therefore, this need not be a permanent risk
factor. It also follows immediately that since human capital formation
does exercise this inﬂuence, signiﬁcant dangers arise from this poten-
tially potent policy tool. Narrow sectional interests may capture the
policy making process, and pursue their speciﬁc interests through the
human capital creation, with profound consequences for the political,
social and institutional processes. Fractionalization may come to be
fostered, deepened and then mobilized in the interests of speciﬁci n -
terests, with distributional conﬂict and hence lower growth following
apace. South Africa, with its pursuit of narrowly based racial poli-
cies which were often pursued precisely through the medium of the
educational system provides a particularly salient example of just this
danger.
In addition to its impact on linguistic fractionalization, human
capital comes to inﬂuence not only growth, but distributional conﬂict
directly also. In opening these concluding remarks we have already
noted that the quality of human capital raises growth, while both the
quality and quantity of human capital raises political instability.
But the point here really extends beyond the immediate ﬁnding.
Middle income countries often ﬁnd themselves in circumstances of sub-
stantial social and political upheaval. Our ﬁndings suggest that under
such circumstances, human capital investment is a source for such dy-Does Human Generate Social and Institutional Capital? 38
namics, by raising political aspirations and hence the motivation for
social and political transformation. Growth needs more than physi-
cal capital accumulation. But the associated need for human capital
investment may well carry the seeds of destruction for any political
elites expanding human capital endowments with narrow intentions of
raising economic without political welfare.
Finally, there is more good news here. Since human capital does
not stand alone, but itself comes to respond to economic (as well
as institutional) development, embarking on a positive growth path
appears to promise unleashing the forces of social and political trans-
formation. Undemocratic dispensations may well be able to choose
growth compatible development paths; but the absence of democracy
does not appear sustainable with the consequence (including rising
human capital endowments) of development.
Pointing to the possibility that social, institutional and political
dimensions may be important to growth are helpful in widening our
understanding of long run economic prospects. But we need to bear in
mind both that such characteristics are not immutable over time, and
that such dimensions may have strong links to human capital forma-
tion both at various levels of education, and in a variety of diﬀerent
dimensions of human capital investment.
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 Description 
LANGFRAC  Linguistic fractionation: based on national census information. 
RELFRAC  Religious fractionation: based on national census information. 
POLFRAC  Political fractionation: based on representation in national parliament. 
INSTAB  Political instability: based on measure reported in Fedderke et al. (2000). 
RACE  Racial fractionation: based on national census information. 
lnRGDP  Log of real GDP. 
GROWTH  Growth in real GDP. 
lnRPCGDP  Log of real per capita GDP. 
PCGROWTH  Growth in real per capita GDP. 
POLRGHT  Political rights: based on measure reported in Fedderke et al. (2000). 
PROPRGHT  Property rights: based on measure reported in Fedderke et al. (2000). 
dK/dt  Change in real capital stock. 
WPUBPTR  White public school pupil teacher ratio: based on measure reported in Fedderke et al. (1999). 
WMATHPRP  White proportion of matriculants reading mathematics: based on measure reported in 
Fedderke et al. (1999). 
BPUBPTR  Black public school pupil teacher ratio: based on measure reported in Fedderke et al. (1999). 
BMATHPRP  Black proportion of matriculants reading mathematics: based on measure reported in 
Fedderke et al. (1999). 
WENROL  White primary and secondary school enrolment rate: based on measure reported in Fedderke 
et al. (1999). 
CAENROL  Coloured and Asian primary and secondary school enrolment rate: based on measure 
reported in Fedderke et al. (1999). 
lnBENROL  Log of black primary and secondary school enrolment rate: based on measure reported in 
Fedderke et al. (1999). 
lnTOTENROL  Log of total primary and secondary school enrolment rate: based on measure reported in 
Fedderke et al. (1999). 
lnTOTDEGR  Log of total degrees issued by all South African universities: based on measure reported in 
Fedderke et al. (2003). 
NESDEG  Total number of degrees issued by all South African universities in the natural, engineering 
and mathematical sciences: based on measure reported in Fedderke et al. (2003). 
NESDEGPRP  Proportion of total degrees issued in the the natural, engineering and mathematical sciences 
by South African universities: based on measure reported in Fedderke et al. (2003). 
APPRENT  Total number of apprenticeship contracts registered: based on measure reported in Fedderke 
et al. (2003). 
WMATRICPRAT  White matriculation pass rate: based on measure reported in Fedderke et al. (1999). 
BMATRICPRAT  Black matriculation pass rate: based on measure reported in Fedderke et al. (1999). 
WMATRICPR  Proportion of white school pupils in matric year: based on measure reported in Fedderke et 
al. (1999). 
lnBMATRICPR  Log of proportion of black school pupils in matric year: based on measure reported in 
Fedderke et al. (1999). 
WRPCEXP  Real per capita expenditure on white school pupils: based on measure reported in Fedderke 
et al. (1999). 
BRPCEXP  Real per capita expenditure on black school pupils: based on measure reported in Fedderke 
et al. (1999). 
LOTE  Log-odds ratio for total primary and secondary school enrolment rates. 
LOWE  Log-odds ratio for white primary and secondary school enrolment rates. 
LOBE  Log-odds ratio for black primary and secondary school enrolment rates. 
LONESE  Log-odds ratio for proportion of total degrees issued in the natural, engineering and 
mathematical sciences. 
LOCAE  Log-odds ratio for coloured and asian primary and secondary school enrolment rates. 
LOWMAPR  Log-odds ratio for white matriculation pass rate.  
LOBMAPR  Log-odds ratio for black matriculation pass rate.  
LOWMTPR  Log-odds ratio for white proportion of matriculants sitting mathematics. 
LOBMTPR  Log-odds ratio for white proportion of matriculants sitting mathematics. 
LOWMAPO  Log –odds ratio for proportion of white scholars in matriculation year. 
LOBMAPO  Log –odds ratio for proportion of black scholars in matriculation year. Appendix B: The Univariate Structure of the Data ADF Statistics on Stationarity
 
 
Variable  v I(0)  v I(1)  v I(2)  Critical Value 
LANGFRAC -3.45*  -  -  -2.92 
RELFRAC -2.40  -1.36  -8.07*  -2.91 
POLFRAC -1.97  -7.54*  -  -2.90 
INSTAB -3.43  -7.66*  -  -3.49 
RACE 1.25  -1.12  -6.01*  -2.90 
LNRGDP -2.18  -4.86*  - -2.90 
GROWTH -4.82*  -  -  -2.91 
POLRGHT -033  -4.61*  -  -2.92 
PROPRGHT 1.39  -6.69* -  -2.93 
dK/dT -0.74  -5.56*  -  -2.93 
WMATHPRP -1.79  -7.14*  -  -2.92 
BPUBPTR -1.34  -8.40*  -  -2.92 
BMATHPRP -2.91  -6.98*  -  -2.96 
WENROL -0.35  -6.42*  -  -2.90 
CAENROL -1.11  -4.37*  -  -2.92 
lnBENROL 0.29  -4.56*  -  -2.92 
lnTOTENROL 0.46 -4.56*  -  -2.92 
lnTOTDEGR -1.19  -3.58*  -  -2.90 
NESDEG 3.81  -4.95*  - -2.90 
NESDEGPRP -2.75  -8.16*  -  -2.90 
APPRENT -1.97  -3.35*  -  -2.91 
WMATRICPR -0.76 -3.94*  -  -2.90 
lnBMATRICPR -0.60  -5.49*  -  -3.00 
WRPCEXP -1.35  -5.27*  -  -2.90 
BRPCEXP 0.28  -5.30*  -  -2.92 
LOTE 1.34  1.05  -8.69*  -2.92 
LOWE -0.15  -6.43*  -  -2.90 
LOBE 1.77  -0.90  -7.90*  -2.92 
LONESE -2.21  -11.07*  - -2.90 
LOCAE -0.90  -4.23*  -  -2.92 
LOMAPR 0.08  -9.96*  - -2.90 
LOBPAPR -1.68  -5.68*  -  -2.99 
LOWMTPR -2.45  -5.56* -  -2.90 
LOBMTPR -2.96  -4.94*  -  -2.99 
LOWMAPO 0.13  -6.11* -  -2.90 
















 Table I: PSS F-tests for direction of association: human capital measures on institutional measures. Row headings denote outcome variables. 
Column headings forcing variables. * denotes unambiguous significance of the test statistics, allowing the rejection of the null of no association. 













NESDEG  NESPRP  LOWESE APPRENT WPUBPTR BPUBPTR 
RELFRAC  3.67  3.73  2.34  2.43  2.22  2.21  3.81 3.90  3.04 2.77 2.03 2.08 1.94  3.07 5.09** 
LANGFRAC 189.83*  204.41*  18.34*  21.10* 80.41* 86.03* 12.21*  12.22* 12.30*  12.29*  12.70* 12.78* 12.47*  12.00*  9.72* 
POLFRAC  2.65  1.65  2.50  1.34  2.92  2.15  2.00 1.81  3.78 4.40 1.38 2.16 4.70  2.67  2.79 
POLRGHT 5.34**  2.35  0.91  1.02  3.84  4.34  4.87 2.88  4.86  7.06* 3.38  3.74 1.01 5.65** 0.09 
PROPRGHT  5.27**  5.22**  4.02  4.19  5.35**  6.01*  4.03  5.03* 3.02  5.13**  4.70 4.42 2.00 6.20* 2.98 
INSTAB 12.07*  10.60*  7.46*  7.99  11.39*  10.11*  11.68*  10.16*  9.46*  8.63*  5.13**  4.18  3.45  9.35*  5.19** 
LNRGDP 1.45  0.30  2.62  2.39  1.78  2.26  1.17  0.49  1.73  2.20  16.06*  2.86  3.28  3.99  4.2 
GROWTH  7.54*  7.98*  6.56*  6.75*  4.23  4.46  8.66*  8.03* 8.48*  8.35* 4.25  4.39  4.86  7.68*  1.6 
LNRGDPCAP  1.73  0.73  2.56  2.54  3.44  3.99  0.89 1.05  1.61 2.41 3.23 3.33 3.80  4.16  3.43 
GROWTHCAP  1.21  6.71*  6.83*  7.00*  3.55  3.83  8.62*  8.03* 8.13*  8.31* 4.48  4.49  4.61  7.86*  1.9 
LNK 0.54  0.79  1.71  1.67  2.14  2.79  0.25  0.70  4.28  1.18  6.30*  6.96*  1.23  1.91  5.90* 
DKDT 1.36  1.25  1.29  1.52 2.58 3.02 1.27  1.29 3.55  1.00  6.93*  7.71* 0.98  1.01  0.43 
RACEFRAC  3.08  4.94**  3.37  3.87  2.99  3.14  2.54 4.76  2.82 2.87 0.79 0.31 3.14  0.42  1.5 




























RELFRAC  1.19  1.87  0.56  0.61  3.69  2.64  1.52 0.71  2.63 2.79 1.68 2.27 2.30  3.68   
LANGFRAC 30.15*  11.35*  1.64 1.80 8.53*  8.30* 1.21  0.93 12.54*  103.04*  7.03* 3.96  15.21*  57.98*   
POLFRAC  3.23  2.51  1.87  1.35  5.17**  1.99  0.64 1.98  0.37 0.82 2.46 2.16 4.58  1.36   
POLRGHT 2.92  2.99  4.13  4.71  0.67  0.64  1.59  2.78 4.63  4.95  5.07**  5.41**  6.05*  11.38*   
PROPRGHT  5.08*  4.14  0.54  1.70  5.06**  2.85  4.25 3.87  4.02 3.87 3.77 4.13 3.81 12.92*   
INSTAB 3.73  4.14  3.01  1.83  3.70  3.75  3.98  4.10  11.12*  8.93*  2.92  2.78  6.07*  11.36*   
LNRGDP  2.06 3.89 4.11  2.87 3.16 4.09  5.69** 3.92  7.10* 8.77*  1.82  2.24  9.14*  6.82*   
GROWTH  6.65*  7.66*  1.42  0.86  5.63**  7.94*  8.51*  5.03**  11.44*  13.52* 2.00  2.52 5.53** 8.40*   
LNRGDPCAP 2.42  3.28  4.03  4.25  3.85 5.31**  7.96*  3.21  7.33* 10.11*  2.06  1.89  7.61*  8.94*   
GROWTHCAP  6.39*  7.50*  1.96  0.88  5.35**  7.60*  8.58*  4.95**  11.68*  13.60* 2.03  2.59 5.43** 8.47*   
LNK 2.34  4.57  12.74*  13.87*  4.22  4.05  4.66  2.45  1.01  2.40  5.24**  4.47  1.36  2.60   
DKDT 2.15  2.70  0.46  0.56 1.58 1.38 4.79  1.89 0.90  0.61  3.73 1.02 0.84  1.74   
RACEFRAC  1.10  0.95  0.88  5.94*  0.13  0.12  9.07*  4.78  2.38 2.68 1.75 1.12 2.94  1.54   
 
 
 Table II: PSS F-tests for direction of association: institutional measures on human capital measures. Row headings denote outcome variables. 
Column headings forcing variables. * denotes unambiguous significance of the test statistics, allowing the rejection of the null of no association. 
** denotes an indeterminate test statistic. 
 
 
 RelFrac  LangFrac  PolFrac  PolRght  PropRght  Instab  lnRGDP Growth  lnRGDPCAP  GrowthCap  lnK  dKdt  Race 
Totenrol  1.52 2.31 1.83 0.89 0.43 2.46 1.95 2.34  1.25  2.38  1.34 1.63 1.48 
LOTE 2.21  1.67  3.14  1.3  3.29  6.32*  1.91 0.87  2.15  0.91  1.7 1.13 1.3 
Wenrol 2.73  4.55  1.03  11.38*  1.54  0.8 2.78 0.2  2.22  2.22 7.63*  0.44  1.62 
LOWE 2.64  3.65  0.97  9.49*  1.83  0.72  3.45 0.17  2.08  0.53 6.69*  0.53 1.42 
Caenrol  2.73  1.1  2.98 3.52 0.25 1.28 7.46* 0.48  14.97*  0.46  8.05* 2.1  0.9 
LOCAE 2.78  0.9  2.66  3.4  0.52  0.87  9.60* 0.75  14.28*  0.67  8.04* 1.98 0.69 
Benrol 2.41  2.62  3.01  2.38  0.3  3.19 2.68 2.98  2  3.05  1.72 2.05 1.38 
LOBE  2.65 0.88 4.22 3.45 3.78  8.14* 2.8 0.83  3.06  0.87 2.61  1.04  0.82 
TotalDeg 3.6  2.25  4.17  0.72  9.44*  5.06** 3.76  3.67  3.65  3.67  1.38  1.89  1.48 
NESDeg 0.44  2.39  6.69*  0.83  5.88*  6.07* 5.37**  4.75  4.92  4.78  3.89  1.88  1.25 
NESPrp  5.85* 0.41 0.75 0.79 0.81 1.03 2.88 1.8  1.94  1.73 2.36  0.03  17.32* 
LOWESE  4.77 0.23  17.8*  0.77 0.71 0.85 2.08 1.95  1.69  1.86  1.18 0.01  19.28* 
Apprent  4.02 1.84  1.7 1.82 3.84 3.84 0.84 3.41  1.06  3.58 7.22*  2.72 0.21 
Wpubptr  2.19 0.04 7.47* 3.2  2.36 0.72 2.29 0.72  2.55  0.71  4.08 2.95 3.16 
Bpubptr  8.10* 3.28 2.88 3.58 3.99 1.86  5.15** 1.51  4.78  1.51  7.79* 3.86 6.78* 
Wmatprat 6.33* 0.1  5.01**  2.12 0.45 0.66 4.43 4.39  3.75  4.48  0.04 0.04 0.96 
LOWMAPR  2.26 0.48  1.9 1.11 0.47 2.64  3.47  2.33  0.7  2.42  2.39 0.003 1.27 
Bmatprat  5.80*  5.72**  3.46 1.57 2.33 1.01 1.6 1.64  0.56  1.66 3.56  3.24  1.57 
LOBMAPR 5.85*  6.18*  5.86*  1.25  1.56  1.88 1.23 1.09  0.44  1.09  2.37 3.32 0.62 
Wmathprp 4.67 3.24 1.55 3.7  4.24  5.69** 4.14  2.18  4.42  2.22  2.49  4.63  2.88 
LOWMTPR  3.45 3.57 1.85 3.92  4.4 5.27* 3.07 6.37*  3.56  6.54*  2.84 4.83 1.34 
Bmathprp 1.76  1.59  3.87  1.29 2.6 3.68 2.74 2.09  3.68  2.1  3.52 2.61 0.95 
LOBMTPR  1.99 1.86 6.60* 2.3  2.88 1.97 2.24 1.53  2.07  1.52  1.16 1.85 3.9 
Wmatricpr 0.19 0.52 2.38 1.26 1.15 1.53 2.25 0.11  1.91  0.11  4.96 0.57 1.17 
LOWMAPO  0.63 0.01 1.02 1.84 1.54 1.08 1.63  0.1  1.33  0.1  4.76 0.74 3.14 
Bmatricpr  0.91 4.07 3.07 0.19 2.57 2.16 0.53 1.36  0.61  1.38 7.94*  2.54 2.87 
LOBMAPO  1.29 2.99 1.29 0.26 1.13 0.65 2.47 0.53  0.04  0.52  4.71 1.7  2.6 
Wrpcexp 2.5  6.32*  1.1  1.06  0.44  2.96 0.84 1.24  1.27  1.27 24.92*  0.81 1.69 
Brpcexp  0.15 0.76 3.62 1.45 3.25  7.19* 2.54  1.04  1.66  1.04  4.76 2.39 3.21 
 
  
Table III: Multivariate ARDL Cointegration extensions. * denotes significance at the 5%, ** at the 
10% level. ηAR, ηH denote a chi-squared distributed test for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity 
respectively. ARDL denotes the optimal lag structure chosen on the basis of the relevant information 
criterion. Φ denotes the error correction term in the ARDL specification, and adj-R
2 the goodness of fit 
of the ARDL specification. AIC denotes the Akaike information criterion, “Manual” the manual choice 
of a lag structure for the ARDL, Adj-R
2 the use of the adjusted R
2 information criterion. Round 
parentheses denote standard errors. Square parentheses denote probability levels. 
 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 













































































          



















































2 0.96 0.96  0.55  0.46 0.54  0.57  0.39 0.44 






























Table IV: Maximal eigenvalue and trace statistics; VAR=2; * denotes rejection of the null at the 5%, ** 









Trace Statistic  95% Critical 
Value 
r=0 r=1  107.17*  61.22  310.14*  215.79 
r≤1 r=2  63.61*  55.83  202.97*  177.79 
r≤2 r=3  39.20  50.10  139.36**  141.73 
r≤3 r=4  34.04  43.72  100.16  108.90 
r≤4 r=5  22.35  37.85  66.12  81.20 
r≤5 r=6  19.31  31.68  43.77  56.43 
r≤6 r=7  15.60  24.88  24.46  35.37 







































Table V: Structural Equation Estimation Results 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 




















































0.00 0.00  0.004 
(0.0002
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INVRAT 0.00  -1.91 
(0.61) 
0.00   -0.98 
(0.27) 
0.00 0.00  -0.34 
(0.09) 
0.00 
UC 0.00  -0.06 
(0.01) 
0.00 0.00  -0.02 
(0.002
) 




CRIM 0.00  20.84 
(2.89) 























































  Elasticities at Means:  Elasticities at Means:  Elasticities at Means: 
DRACE 2.10  168.48  -0.14  0.18  29.90    0.61     
LYPC 54.80    -3.77  11.38   3.13  13.91    -2.89 
INSTAB   0.02  -0.07   0.03      0.05  -0.05 
POL    -0.01      0.47      -0.27 
PROP 0.05      3.98   -0.34  0.16  0.00   
INVRAT   -0.42      -0.22      -
0.07 
 
UC   -0.72      -0.19      -
0.05 
 
CRIM   1.15              
NESPR -14.68  -1.83    -37.35  -0.96    -30.28 -
1.55 
 
TENROL 74.96    -5.09 -26.46    2.42  -4.17    -0.97 
 